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Analysis and Modeling of Corruption among Entrepreneurs

Análisis y modelización de la corrupción entre emprendedores

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Abstract.

Bribery may eradicate social welfare. In the current research, we inspected the mechanism of bribery behaviour based on the (NASH Theory or Non-Cooperative static game theory) which stated by John Forbes Nash Jr. in 1978. With the general hypothesis of "*Rational Player*," two bimatrix game models are settled to evaluate the briber and the bribee strategy choice. After discussing the cost-benefit of the (Participants or players), some useful conclusions and dissolve analysis are drawn out. The current study provides three novel experiments that put both metaphors to the test. Overall, a little quantitative study has investigated sequential unethical behaviour. Insomuch prior studies focus on third-party observers' acceptance of continuous vs. abrupt immoral acts, or the role of self-control and ethical disengagement in the slippery slope of lesser cheating acts empirical investigation contrasting ongoing to the abrupt occurrence of corruption is missing altogether. Recent advances in empirical corruption studies methodology allow the first examination of these different procedures while preserving the economic costs and benefits constant. In the current study, we used a recently improved corruption game by [Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti, Van Lange, 2015].

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Keywords: Corruption, Social Psychology, Behaviour, Descriptive Norms, John Nash Equilibrium

Resumen.

El soborno puede erradicar el bienestar social. En la investigación actual, inspeccionamos el mecanismo del comportamiento de soborno basado en la (Teoría NASH o teoría del juego estático no cooperativo) que declaró John Forbes Nash Jr. en 1978. Con la hipótesis general de "Rational Player", dos juegos de bimatrix Se establecen modelos para evaluar el soborno y la elección de la estrategia de soborno. Después de discutir el costo-beneficio de los (Participantes o jugadores), se extraen algunas conclusiones útiles y análisis de disolución. El estudio actual proporciona tres experimentos novedosos que ponen a prueba ambas metáforas. En general, un pequeño estudio cuantitativo ha investigado el comportamiento no ético secuencial. Algunos estudios previos se centran en la aceptación por parte de observadores externos de actos inmorales continuos versus abruptos, o el papel del autocontrol y la desconexión ética en la pendiente resbaladiza de los actos de engaño menores. . Los avances recientes en la metodología de estudios empíricos de corrupción permiten el primer examen de estos diferentes procedimientos al tiempo que mantienen constantes los costos y beneficios económicos. En el estudio actual, utilizamos un juego de corrupción recientemente mejorado por [Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti, Van Lange, 2015].

Palabras clave: corrupción, Psicología Social, Comportamiento, Normas descriptivas, John Nash Equilibrium

Introduction

Major forms of corruption constitute a serious threat to the functioning of societies. The most frequent description to explain how severe corruption emerges is the slippery slope metaphor – the notion that corruption unfolds gradually. While having widespread theoretical and intuitive appeal, this notion has hardly been tested empirically. We used a recently developed paradigm to test whether severe corrupt acts unfold gradually or abruptly. The results of three experimental studies revealed a higher likelihood of severe corruption when participants directly faced this option (abrupt) compared to when they had previously engaged in minor forms of corruption (gradual). Neither the size of the payoffs, which we kept constant nor evaluations of the actions could account for these differences. Contrary to widely shared beliefs, sometimes the route to corruption resembles a steep cliff rather than a slippery slope.

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This instance represents a structure of immorality – described in this literature as *“misuse of an organizational characteristic or authority for private or organizational (or sub-unit) gain, where misuse, in turn, refers to departures from approved societal scales”* (Anand, V., Ashforth, B. E., andamp; Joshi, M., 2004). Immorality frequently impairs the performance of groups, organizations and communities (Rose-Ackerman, S., 2006). Experimental investigations into immorality show very damaging social outcomes. For example, lack of acceptable government development (Mauro, P., 1995), waste of national wealth (Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., Kaufmann, D., andamp; Schankerman, M., 2000), and destruction of nature. Extensive studies of immorality in various fields were examined (Bardhan, P., 1997; Ostrom, E., Burger, J., andamp; Field, C., 1999). In general, greater than one correlates of immorality is obtained, from lack of transparency (Rose-Ackerman, S., 1997), colonial history (Treisman, D., 2000) to extractive institutions (Acemoglu, D., andamp; Robinson, J., 2012) that are used for closer survey (Rose-Ackerman, S., 2006; Rothstein, B., 2011a). Heretofore, immorality research has dedicated an awful lot much much less interest to psychological elements that assist in providing an explanation for why immorality is prevalent in some literature while being almost unavailable in different types of literature (see for some essential exceptions) (Darley, J.

M., 2005; Dungan, J., Waytz, A., andamp; Young, L., 2014; Lee-Chai, A. Y., andamp; Bargh, J., 2001; Mazar, N., andamp; Aggarwal, P., 2011).

With notice to psychological factors that influence immorality, researchers (Rothstein, B., 2000) in politics and economics (Lambsdorff, J. G., andamp; Frank, B., 2011) have emphasized the importance of realized social scales (Haidt, J., andamp; Kesebir, S., 2010). Social scales are those beliefs that exist in relation to others. As we will argue, immorality agents can use descriptive scales to determine the likelihood of success of immoral transactions as a decision criterion. Therefore, we attempted to examine the impact of descriptive scales on the decision to engage in immorality using a single immorality behavioural index in three imperative researches. REICE | 265

Subject to realize the way scales have an effect on immoral behaviour we have to distinguish two fundamental kinds of scales named descriptive and injunctive scales. Descriptive scales bring facts associated with how most human beings behave in a specified position. They also express the number of times a particular behaviour has been observed. Injunctive scales bring information associated with the specific movements that almost everybody accepts or rejects– hence, whether this particular behaviour is suitable and moral (Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., andamp; Kallgren, C., 1990; Reno, R. R., Cialdini, R. B., andamp; Kallgren, C. A., 1993)..

In the current article, we focus on how descriptive scales influence immorality behaviour for two fundamental reasons. First, descriptive scales are subject to inter-community variance. That is, the descriptive scales associated with immorality differ significantly in a given social literature (Kurer, O., 2005; Persson, A., Rothstein, B., andamp; Teorell, J., 2012; Rothstein, B., andamp; Eek, D., 2009) - human has different beliefs related to the abundance of immorality (Lambsdorff, J. G., Taube, M., andamp; Schramm, M., 2005). Injecting scales related to immorality change in the three social literatures drastically. People often find convergent and immoral beliefs to be immoral and false - even in the literature where immorality is prevalent (Karklins, R., 2005). This moral conviction is also

proven in law law (Mungiu-Pippidi, A., 2006; Mungiu-Pippidi, A., 2017). Immorality is a crime under most national bylaws (Olken, B. A., andamp; Pande, R., 2012).

Second, injunctive scales are much less malleable than descriptive scales. While the views above associated with immorality being incorrect and inappropriate are relatively stable, the beliefs related to the descriptive scales associated with immorality can be subject to change. Notably, in domains in which humans do not have their personal experience with immorality, the beliefs associated with the abundance of immorality are malleable. Changing descriptive scales is provided as one of the most promising approaches to fight immorality (Rothstein, B., 2000).

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In general, it can be said that descriptive scales change in different societies and are generally flexible. In some sociological studies, immorality is realized as pervasive, and in other studies, relying on the game theoretical model claim that immorality ([Kosfeld, M., 1997]) is almost non-existent ([Bicchieri, C., andamp; Rovelli, C., 1995]. Small and large communities can balance the limits of immorality by considering the results and abundance of immorality in research. The important point is that the balance must be stable, which is not usually the case stable (Bicchieri, C., andamp; Rovelli, C., 1995). A system has a capability to move from excessive descriptive immorality scales to low descriptive immorality scales and vice versa (Ashforth, B. E., andamp; Anand, V., 2003). To achieve this, immorality-related rules need to be formulated to influence immoral behavior (Dong, B., Dulleck, U., andamp; Torgler, B., 2012; Rothstein, B., 2000; Bicchieri, C., andamp; Rovelli, C., 1995).

Imagine bribing a police officer after violating the traffic law. If you believe in venality, you will feel empowered and successful by paying a payola such as slipping a note into your driver's license, because you have escaped a heavy fine. In this case, the anticipated value of accepting a payola by a police officer is higher than the probable penalty. However, if you think that this type of immorality is less pervasive and less frequent, this approach may put you at greater risk than previously stated. In this situation, the achievable reprimand for trying a payola outweighs the expected value of payola

acceptance. Complementing this example, it has been repeatedly stated that the abundance of immoral behaviour depends on whether one considers others immoral. This does not mean that one considers it unacceptable or illegal (Dong, B., Dulleck, U., andamp; Torgler, B., 2012; Ariely, D., 2012; Olivier De Sardan, J., 1999).

In other words, these interpretations suggest that descriptive scales influence immoral behaviour. Previous studies have not yet established this relationship empirically. This was partly due to the lack of appropriate methods to investigate immoral behaviour. For this reason, this study not only explores this issue, it also introduces an idiosyncratic immorality game. In this game, we ask participants to imagine that they are the CEO of a development company and their bridge construction contract is on the desk of a official. Then we ask them to decide whether to payola the official. Therefore, their behaviour will be more influenced by realized descriptive scales and less by personal experience.

We include a immoral deal in this economic game frame. In other words, we hide the immoral motion in the form of a unique valid public invitation that has commercial profits. on the other hand, they have been explicitly asked to pay payolas or frankly withhold payment. Even members were involved in paying payolas. Masking corruption causes its prolongation, as it reduces its impact on favorable social conditions. (i.e., human beings no longer attractive in immorality due to the fact it is socially unacceptable). However, this behaviour used to be once however realized as 'immoral' as individuals across all three research realized the invites of the public authentic as significantly more immoral than not inviting the public official (all ps andlt; .016).

In this paper, we set out to evaluation whether descriptive scales – the belief associated with the abundance of immorality in given literature – anticipate immoral behaviour. Using the idiosyncratic immorality game, we performed three studies. First, we examined two correlational research whether the realized descriptive scales previously than (First immorality study) and after (Second immorality study) the immorality game correlate with immoral behaviour in the game. Second, in order to evaluation the causal relationship, we

set up an experiment in which facts associated with descriptive scales were manipulated to examine its effect on the subsequent immoral behaviour (Third immorality study).

Corruption has a profound effect on the process of improving economic and social conditions, and it also affects the legislative, economic and social conditions (Gino & Bazerman, 2009). This article shows that the consequences of corruption are very widespread, causing many problems for the prospective and sustainable development and ultimately harming all segments of society. This article examines the corruption in light of the latest achievements and research and then presents the results (Welsh, Ordóñez, Snyder, & Christian, 2014). Therefore, we establish a meaningful link among different theories in related research. We thus achieve norms, and in view of the behaviour of corruption, we must be able to distinguish between two fundamental aspects of norms: descriptive and injunctive norms (cf. Serra & Wantchekon, 2012). Descriptive norms bring facts associated with how most human beings behave in a specified position. They also express the number of times a particular behaviour has been observed. Injunctive norms bring information associated with the specific movements that almost everybody accepts or rejects—hence, whether this particular behaviour is suitable and moral.

The social psychology of immorality

On the 12th of January 2010, an earthquake strikes Haiti. The death toll in the field was more than 100,000. The researchers tried to find a justification for this atrocious damage (Ambraseys, N., andamp; Bilham, R., 2011). This was not the largest earthquake, but the result of the immorality that was actually responsible for so many casualties. Immorality destroyed the quality of construction, infrastructure and support structures. There is no more need to exemplify the destructive consequences of immorality around the world. Immorality is one of the most complex social issues facing different societies today (Lee-Chai, A. Y., andamp; Bargh, J., 2001; Mauro, P., 1995). This destroys democracy and trust (Stiglitz, J., 2012). It also weakens the power of governments. It spreads injustice in societies and destroys or overused nature (Ostrom, E., 2000; Rothstein, B., 2011a).

It is not out of the question to do a lot of research on immorality and immoral behavior (Serra, D., andamp; Wantchekon, L., 2012) and its impact on decision making in different communities. Laypersons and scientists like him pointed to specific behaviours in their debates about immorality, including: the leader of a corporatist government embezzling public property; the exchange of gifts between government employees and citizens, or many other behaviours that can be described as “*abuses of power for personal gain*” (Graycar, A., andamp; Smith, R. G., 2011). As will be stated, different comments and research on immorality and immoral behaviours will help to better understand immorality and their causes from different scientific perspectives, especially when each person uses his or her own unique experiences and problems in research.

The current research attempts to evaluate psychologically immoral activities using predictive strategies and to simulate this parameter mentally in order to predict future performance. Humans are uniquely equipped to experience the hedonic value beforehand (Buckner, R., andamp; Carroll, D., 2007; Gilbert, D., 2006), which is likely to be largely eliminated in the future and even events that they will not experience in any way (Gilbert, D., andamp; Wilson, T., 2007). This simulation seems to be either enjoyable or painful for a practical event to personally choose a particular path for movement (Schwarz, N., andamp; Strack, F., 1999).

To better address the issue of immorality, we present it as a social problem. Much of the immorality for the sake of personal preference for the sake of personal preference is moment to long-term collective interest (Van Veldhuizen, R., 2013). In immorality-related studies, a power holder is challenged between the abuse of power and responsibility: immorality (abuse of power) has its own interests, and no immorality for the profit of the public will be held accountable (Blau, A., 2009). Furthermore, to understand the complicated dynamics concerned in immorality, we moreover define a distinction between personal and interpersonal immorality as we will describe, everyone that of them entails unique decision-making strategies concerning the mental illustration of expected future outcomes.

Personal immorality is an immoral activity in which a person abuses his or her status and uses it for personal gain (e.g., embezzlement and theft of public property); but interpersonal immorality is where some people work together to exploit their position for their own personal gain (e.g., venality, kick-back payments and set up fixed networks). Given these differences, the psychological components of immorality are identified and the expected consequences of individual and interpersonal immorality are achieved (see Fig 1).

To illustrate the special distinction between personal and interpersonal immorality, the following examples are necessary: Consider a government manager with the power of budget management to train an area. The administrator discovers a misconception in the accounting system that results from an inaccurate reporting of the actual budget of education and indicates that the administrator intends to pocket the education budget. Here the manager has a social dilemma and embezzles money instead of allocating it to schools. This shape of private immorality turns into improved probably if the administrator anticipates low chances of formal reprimand and low psychological costs such as the feeling of guilt in the direction of the victims of that immoral activity, i.e., the targeted recipient of the education funds.

On the other hand, for the purpose of interpersonal immorality, the government director needs the assistance of an accountant to transfer public property. In that case, every person is interested in participating in immorality (Weisel, O., andamp; Shalvi, S., 2015). If the accountant makes an immoral offer, the manager will face a complex social challenge. He is involved in deciding between his own wishes, an accountant's suggestion, or a collective interest, a decision that can have many consequences. Here, the probable conduct of the accountant affects the cost/profit estimation (e.g., the constants risk of disclosure). In addition, a manager has to make a complex decision; in fact, he has an ethical deal between fairness "Be fair and give money to the public" and loyalty "*Be faithful and act for the profit of your immoral partner*" (Dungan, Waytz, andamp; Young, [Dungan, J., Waytz, A., andamp; Young, L., 2014]). If the latter outstrips the former, management expects that there will be no guilt for interpersonal immorality. Thus,

as will be elaborated in more detail, the interpersonal immorality problems are greater than the personal immorality problems because they are all directly involved in immorality.

In other words, personal and interpersonal immorality refers to particular psychological aspects of decision making. Although there are differences between crime and immorality, there is also no theoretical framework for the root (Clinard, M. B., andamp; Quinney, R., 1973; Finney, H. C., andamp; Lesieur, H. R., 1982) and intrinsic factor of these approaches (e.g. [Amundsen, I., 1999; Heidenheimer, A. J., 1970; Pinto, J., Leana, C. R., andamp; Pil, F. K., 2008]). This lack is largely due to the neglect of immorality in the areas of personality, morality, and social psychology. In fact, widespread social communication and multilateral decision-making processes in the field of immorality make it a confusing matter.

The Road to Bribery and Corruption: Slippery Slope or Steep Cliff? Numerous media report almost daily about new cases of corruption in various contexts, such as banking, sports, or politics. These scandals raise questions about how severe corruption emerges. Like most popular media, many scientists suggest that severe ethical transgressions such as corruption unfold gradually, a process that is frequently referred to as a “*slippery slope*” (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Bandura, 1999; Darley, 2005; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Gino & Bazerman, 2009). The belief is that power holders progressively neglect the interest of others and pursue selfish interests and “*slide into*” corruption (Kipnis, Castell, Gergen, & Mauch, 1976). While this widespread logic has strong intuitive appeal, there is no experimental research that examines whether such a gradual process indeed presupposes major forms of corruption. With three experimental studies, using a recently developed methodology, we examine the validity of the slippery slope metaphor and

contrast it to a steep cliff metaphor that argues that corruption comes about by people seizing a one-time opportunity of severe corruption.




Fig 1. Illustration of the intro- and interpersonal dynamics of corruption and how they range for personal and interpersonal corruption

Source. Köbis, NC., 2018

In the following, we first explain the social problems caused by immorality. Using the framework of this social dilemma, we study the types of immorality and describe the common psychological mechanism. We also study the five major psychological factors

related to immorality, personal and interpersonal immorality in terms of the many differences in potential cognition.

Materials and methods

Correctly evaluating immorality inflicts a variety of subsequences. The analysis of immorality generally faces a certain hurdle, especially if immorality is more covert; in addition, measuring the immorality and the course of immorality is a complex methodological issue. Surveys in the country show that empirical studies have been carried out on immorality.

Currently, three distinct assessments and one ethical index have attracted the attention of the public and students: International Transparency Ethics Understanding International Transparency Index (CPI), Ethics Control Index (CCI), It's called the World Bank. The Inequality Index (CI) has been developed through the Political Risk Services Group (Judge, et al., 2011, p. 95ff) as well as the Heritage Foundation for Economic Freedom (EFI) index. All indicators examine fixed measurement techniques to allow constant time comparison. Anomaly levels are measured using more than one source with complete reliance on expert opinions. Because of their availability, these indicators are often considered in media and academic articles and are used as important information for economic analysis (Ko andamp; Samajdar, 2010, p. 508).

Since the beginning of 1995, the CPI has been projected through Transparency International, a Berlin-based NGO. The index is primarily based on surveys by experts, journalists and company executives and is quite common through research as a credible and reliable provider of ethics measurement. By comparison, since its inception in 1996, the World Bank's CCI Index has emphasized the importance of good governance and anti-ethical ideals as a potential role in the poverty alleviation mission. In addition, the CCI is considered to be both valid and valid, indicating a correlation of 0.97 with the CPI. Such overlap indicates that the CCI statement is significantly in line with the CPI. In line with this, the CI Index includes specific indicators that measure, among other things, the ability

of a business to influence policy strategies and the abundance of monetary payments in the country concerned. In 1980, CI is a cumulative indicator of perception, especially based on estimates by experts in the participating country, indicating a correlation of 0.75 with CPI (Judge et al., 2011, p. 95f). Finally, in 1995, economic freedom was evaluated in more than 179 countries because of the failure of the EFI. Countries fall from zero (suppressed) to 100 (free) with ten measures of economic freedom such as regulatory efficiency, openness of markets and immorality. In 2012, the global average of economic estimates in last year's assessment dropped from 59.7 to 59.5. Despite widespread aspirations, the rating is at its highest level since 2008 at 60.2 and is declining (Heritage Foundation, 2012, p. 1). This index provides a manageable approximation of fertile land where immorality is spread. In general, it can be stated that the indicators all suffer from equal defects. Since immorality is not directly measurable, however, indicators include immoral beliefs and perceptions, and thus encompass all kinds of prejudice. From this point of view, the significance of subsequent moral tactics is at least debatable.

By presenting unique methodological strategies to combat the impediment of accurate ethical measurement, the second task generates a timing shift in the measurement of immorality. Obviously, immorality has already begun to come up with a variety of measuring indicators. Based on the immorality of the widespread attention gained over the past decades, research shows that everything in this context and the real-time dimensions has a significant impact on immoral understanding. This means that the ancestors' cohesion and the effects of immorality are strongly influenced by research time (Judge et al., 2011). Hence, it is a fundamental fact that is taken into account when comparing the time series of immorality.

While cross-country research has provided significant evidence of the immorality of economic development, although the path of causality seems problematic, easy regression does not provide any causal link. On the other hand, as an alternative study, it shows the correlation of unknown origin. As pointed out by Rose-Ackerman (2006), it is difficult to maintain the causes and consequences of immorality, since causality seems to be constantly moving in every direction. These issues mainly arise from later problems,

since the commonly used indicators are based on alternate comprehension rather than "real" immoral analysis. Relying on fundamental errors, introducing instrumental (IV) variables, for example, fractional evaluation can be useful. Therefore, one wants to replace the endogenous variable using IV connectors (cf. Alesina et al. (2003)). The researchers attempted to solve the endogenous problem by separating a dominant correlation between the independent variables and the error term by using the introduction of a new variable that completely affects the primary (e.g. immoral) neutrality variable and dependent variable (e.g. GDP) (Azfar, et al., 2001, p. 51). Instead, the discovery of variables that meet the prerequisites for endogenous testing is challenging.

Furthermore, perceptions-based metrics are likely to be biased because, for example, foreign companies may not have the burden of paying more money than domestic companies pay. Micro-level analyzes gained importance in the late years and provided a solid basis for the discovery of ethical factors and consequences. As a result, these strategies must be coupled with regional and laboratory experiments in order to conduct empirical investigations of immorality.

Lambsdorf (2012), along with these lines of comparison, argues that the principle of rational choice is accompanied by two seemingly contradictory results, one with and one without the illegality of the current barrier. On the one hand, it has to investigate inaccuracies more than ever, because this is due to the fact - at least in the absence of scales, values, and the like - that fraudulent behaviours are completely driven by rational calculations. *"But contrary to this account, we find heads of states who serve their people, public servants who obey the law, people who profit out of existence, and residents who die in non-combat situations. We risk morality, we put it."* (Lambsdorff, 2012, p. 280). On the other hand, because injustice is not the best Nash equilibrium subset, its actual occurrence may already be surprising. In specific procedural settings, as usually happens, popularity plays no role, indicating that payola has no incentive to respond to venal behaviors. Hence, the venal predicts payola deviant behavior (for example, pocket money except for transferring related services) and as a result, he will not have to pay in the first place. Even in duplicate settings, the exchange will eventually end, for what is referred to

as a game effect, shows that payola is diverted at a point of interdependence. This implies that, by using back induction, mites also avoid paying close proximity. Calculating these seemingly contradictory shows that, "*Rational calculus, its calculation of reprimand, is only half the answer to explain human decision making. What is semi-specific?*" (Lambsdorff, REICE | 276, 2012, p. 280).

The other half is likely to respond by using a behavioral approach. Therefore, it must be borne in mind that human decision-making is the most likely of all giants than the characteristics of the underlying environment, institutions, scales, values and the like. Identifying the individual is important as long as he / she interacts with any given environment and therefore influences the decision making of the man or woman (Akerlof andamp; Kranton, 2000).

As a result, a full appreciation of personal decision-making in the technique of criminal literature calls for an inclusive approach. Improving satisfaction with the sustainability of limited rationality and using exploration as an alternative to human ability to utilize complete computation of costs and benefits in order to maximize utility at any time and the benefits of behavioral perspective (cf. Gigerenzer/Selten (2002), Schmid (2004), Wacker (2010), Cartwright (2011)). The body of developing techniques is in addition to the replacement of the logical priority method, the replacement. Subsequent chapters provide evidence for personal decision-making in relation to ordinary and immoral crimes, in particular, beyond conditions of clear rational calculation of costs and benefits.

Nash Equilibrium and Corruption

cost-profit evaluation between the partners

in venality behaviour, what venals and payolas exchange is their interest. the venal desires to achieve advantages which some distance outweigh the cost, and the payola is will to change for payola's "*gift*" with their power via providing venals things and

advantages which venals not or maybe cannot get in ordinary conditions, then, this is the common venality pattern.

in this decision-making process, money-makers want to be fully aware of possible police decisions because they prefer to have an impact on their earnings. likewise, payolas, in addition, fully decide on the conceivable decision of monetary decision makers when choosing. in a unique way, both maximize their profits by thinking about others' decisions. here we analyze the above approach with static play. there are two partners, namely venal and payola. they both have two pure methods that are anomalous, and the blends of the super method lead to a great payout. to ensure their earnings, we first need to test their costs and benefits, which is the most important condition for gaining balance.

state the two partners as a (payola) and b (venal). without losing generality, consider that the two partners have a better understanding of each other (that is, a full-fledged game). partner a gains the power and interests that partner b expects from a. gains such benefits by using anonymity. partner b can earn more than competition. however, in addition to the dangerous costs, it also causes the insects to be dangerous, and causes them to behave.

here d means the skin cost, which includes the cost of currency, the cost of ethics, and the cost of risk. of course, if part b instead of invalidating the game with the help of credible competition, the different types of "cost" would be zero and at the same time, his additional income would be zero. however, there are any other anxious situations where partner b chooses money, while partner a no longer chooses payola. under such circumstances, partner b would also be willing to pay a specific cost, such as e.

for partner a, when partner b pays him, he weighs his interest and wages psychological warfare sooner than decides to approve. here he has two choices: get polio or refuse to pay polio. if he refuses to speak up and maintains his honesty, he will gain ethical pride in honest attention and psychological security, even stopping a fascinating story from now on, so we calculate under this scenario that he will pay b. then he replaces the public power for a positive amount of malice and announces his repayment as a. given the current system and related psychology knowledge, we believe that the cost of risk and the

moral costs he has paid are the benefit of avoiding blame. based on the above evaluation, we can describe the game with the following matrix (table 1) where each pair of numeric values in the brackets represents the payout symbol a and b, respectively.

TABLE 1. THE GAME BETWEEN BRIBERS AND BRIBES

| | | |
|------------|------------|------------|
| B \ A | BRIBERY | NO BRIBERY |
| BRIBERY | (C-D, A-B) | (-E, B) |
| NO BRIBERY | (0, 0) | (0, 0) |

NASH THEORY EVALUATION

as we all know, each of the partners follows profit maximization. due to this fact, count on and for in $a, b, c, d > 0$ and $a > 2b, c > d$ for the income and costs of the partners. the game system is that partners, by thinking about different partner strategies, choose the optimal strategy that gets the most out of them. here is a work on the dominant strategy technique for nash alignment. through the above payback matrix, we see that for partner a, there is no photo to choose partner b, his payout of "payola" is generally not much less than payola's, especially, $a - b > b, 0 = 0$. therefore, in the simple strategy set of partner a, "payola" is superior to "no venality."

similarly, for partner b, because of $c - d > 0, 0 = 0$, the pure strategy "payola" is a strictly dominant strategy. then by turning off the dominant strategy approach, it is useful to gain a special focus on game theory, namely "(absurdity, numbness)". in addition, we can determine that the nash equilibrium "(numbness, numbness)" is also the optimal pareto solution. therefore, partners are more likely to identify anomalies. the above analysis of chinese proverbs shows "throwing a long line to catch a big fish", "if you can't give up your baby, you'll never meet a colorful wolf".

The Nash Equilibrium between Venals

In real life, many monetary recipients also cannot accept this kind of behavior from the inside of their heart to be forced to perform unlawful behaviors by competitors and managers or supervisors more often with the help of these types of unhealthy behaviors. . They may also be concerned that the opposition will become unfair because of the competitors' reality. Then, after doing the same thing, they will have nothing to regret. So basically the evaluation of the game is in the wild. Here we are thinking about static game with full information and there are only two partners shown as partners A and B. Each partner has two pure strategies, justice and injustice. Also, the repayment matrix is shown in Table 2. Where a_i, b_i, c_i, d_i are all negative ($i = 1, 2$). From the assessment of the cost and benefit of the dog, we are aware that, according to the opposition's strategy, partners' profits from distrust are not always less than none, so we have $a_i \geq c_i$ and $b_i \geq d_i$ ($i = 1, 2$). Moreover, then it is convenient to get the unique Nash equilibrium point of the game with the declining dominated approach, that is "(venality, venality)."

TABLE 2. THE GAME AMONG BRIBE-GIVERS

| | | |
|------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| A \ B | BRIBERY | NO BRIBERY |
| BRIBERY | (A ₁ , A ₂) | (B ₁ , C ₂) |
| NO BRIBERY | (C ₁ , B ₂) | (D ₁ , D ₂) |

In a condition that partner A and B are upsides (including venality amount), there is an implied condition in the payoff matrix: $d_i \geq a_i$ ($i = 1, 2$). When each side chooses "no venality" and competes fairly, each of their predicted utilities (i.e., payoff values) are equal, specifically $d_1 = d_2$, if each is to venality, then their payoff values are the margin of the predicted utility and the quantity of venality, respectively. So, there will be $d_i \geq a_i$ ($i = 1, 2$). . At the moment, the game seems to be a "prisoners' dilemma." The optimal Pareto game solution is not Nash's unique equilibrium point but the "(no phobia, numbness)" situation. The top debate suggested that a "self-care strategy" might be helpful. However, this requires your partners to treat others the way you want others to, but only need them to do the same. The Chinese also said, "Don't do what you don't want to do to others."

The Evaluation of Venal's Motivation and the reasons for bribe's Risk

The above analysis has shown us this revelation: Nash's theory of venality play is entirely at the expense and income of partners. The cause why the removing dominated strategy method can be used due to the fact we gave the hypothesis $a > 2b$ and $c > d$, which shows that each partner's profits are a whole lot higher than their cost in a successful venality process. If we change their repayment in the following ways: Improving the Risk of Expenses and Ethical Recipient Expenses:

(1) Promoting rewarding powers for the absence of punitive and supervisory penalties for malignant behaviors, on the other hand, changes in the cost of flanking, and when they are incompatible with it, even without genuinely ugly accusations, they will accordingly be punished.

Therefore, under such a policy, the payoff matrix of the game can be re-written as table 3. Now we evaluate the Nash theory for the new game. Assuming at the element of Nash equilibrium, partner A's optimal strategy is $(p, 1-p)$ and the optimal strategy of partner B is $(q, 1-q)$, i.e., partner A choose the strategy "payola" with the probability p and choose the strategy "no venality" with $1-p$, similarly, partner B chooses his strategy "payola" with q and strategy "no venality" with $1-q$.

TABLE 3. THE NEW GAME OF BRIBERS AND BRIBES

| | | | |
|---|------------|------------|------------|
| B | A | BRIBERY | NO BRIBERY |
| | BRIBERY | (C-D, A-B) | (-E, B) |
| | NO BRIBERY | (0, -B) | (0, 0) |

Therefore, Partner A intends to choose a suitable probability for optimizing the following parametric programming (P_A):

(1)

$$\max pd(a-b) + (1-p)qb - bp(1-q)$$

Thus, we achieve the Nash theory for the new game is a mixed strategy situation $((p^*, 1-p^*), (q^*, 1-q^*))$.

(2)

$$q^* = \frac{b}{b-a}$$

Here, as we can see, when the parameter e improves, the optimal probability of p^* improves.

(3)

$$\max p d(c-d) - e q(1-p)$$

Moreover, the optional solution is;

(4)

$$p^* = \frac{e}{c-d+e}$$

Thus, we achieve the Nash theory for the new game is a mixed strategy situation $((p^*, 1-p^*), (q^*, 1-q^*))$. Here as we can see, when the parameter e improves, the optimal probability p^* improve. This means that because Partner B costs increase the likelihood of a "no pay" reduction. By evaluating the above, we find some profound reasons. In real life, although innocent people suffer moral condemnation and legal reprimand, the practices of futility continue. The goal lies in its inherent economic factors, as well as its incentives to monitor and reward and punish the system. On the one hand, it is difficult to clearly distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate exchanges in the process of social interaction, on the one hand, and interpersonal differences are difficult to account for because of the reality of their compatibility. Interests on the other hand, everyone hopes to expand their interests. The venality game partners are all rational to make the most of their tools. Although we all condemn such behavior, if there is such a need, everybody will come up with such a reason and be able to act. Given this fact, in addition to guiding people's attitudes toward the "personal" and "social optimum" approaches, improving reward and punitive system behaviors are among the compulsory methods available. When it comes to paying a good amount of profit, nobody has the incentive to pay.

Development of Theories and Conceptual Theories.

The magnitude of the interaction between goals and actual behavior depends on three conditions: first, it depends on how specific the behavioral intention and criterion analysis is. It also depends on the degree of consistency of the goals in relation to the difference in measurement time and performance. Finally, the extent to which a person deliberately plays a role is crucial (Madden et al., 1992, p. 4). Experimenting with this method, meta-analyzes indicate successful model predictions of behavioral goals and actual behaviors that are useful for identifying goal strategies for behavior change (Sheppard et al., 1988).

The Theory of Planned Behavior introduces the third aspect, by extending the previously defined simple voluntary control boundary conditions, which affect behavioral goals: realized behavioral control. After reasoning (Ajzen's, 1970; 1980; 1985), realized behavioral control is the main issue with having (realized) the resources and opportunities to perform a particular behavior and exhibiting an extrinsic effect, and on both (indirect) behavioral intentions. And affect actual (direct) behavior. The theory of planned behavior extends the previously defined simple voluntary control boundary conditions, introducing a third aspect, which affects behavioral goals: realized behavioral control. After reasoning, realized behavioral control is the main issue with having (realized) the resources and opportunities to perform a particular behavior and exhibiting an extrinsic effect, and on both (indirect) behavioral intentions. And affect real (direct) behavior. *"The indirect impact is based on the assumption that realized behavioural control has motivational implications for behavioural intentions. When human beings believe that they have little control over performing the behaviour due to the fact of a lack of requisite resources, then their intentions to operate the behaviour may be low likewise if they have favorable attitudes and/ or subjective scales concerning the performance of the behaviour."* (Madden, et al., 1992, p. 4).

Both strategies are appropriate for explaining immoral behaviors as a result of psychological factors, not just economically rational behavior. Here the idea is conveyed that real behavior is the result of cognitive processes, where attitudes, subjective scales, and personal beliefs about their personal control over particular behaviors play a decisive

role. Experimental evidence supports the notion that personal self-esteem is moderately influenced by the ability to perform a particular action (for example, accepting payola) and predicts actual behavior (for empirical aspects cf. Bandura et al. (1980).

As Eliasberg (1951, pp. 326-329) points out, from a psychological perspective, one's actual behavior is not unlikely to be the result of calculating the correct trade, since this risk has not been properly analyzed. Rather, *“immorality is a psychologically unsatisfactory and incomplete, legally wrongful and motivationally unethical alternative for public sympathy.”* Psychological effects on person behaviour to emerge as immoral are diverse, developing interdependencies between the inner and outer world, which are explained in the figure below.




Fig 2. Impacts on Behaviour from a Psychological Point of View

Source. Yolles, 2009, p. 703

Analysis and Results

Throughout the study, we examined whether realized descriptive scales were correlated with immoral behavior. To this end, we evaluated the realized abundance of this particular immoral behavior with an earlier case of immoral play (described in more detail below).

Participants. Students in Polish society who had graduated from programs of higher education from *“Adam Mickiewicz University, Gdansk University of Technology,*

Jagiellonian University, Kozminski University, University of Lodz, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Warsaw, University of Wroclaw.” covering eight difference Polish universities and entrepreneurs consisting of entrepreneurs who had graduated from programs of higher education and other entrepreneurs who had not received any training in ethics (N = 66, Mage = 26.79, SDage = 15.49; 51.5% = female) took part in the study in exchange for direction credit or money (2€). Participants first answered several objects assessing the realized scales associated with workplace-related behaviour – one object assessing the particular immoral practice modeled in the ensuing immorality game.

Ethics statement. All of the studies mentioned in this partnership use the same set of basic experiments. Our College Ethical Analysis Board (VCWE) is the author of this pilot series. In all studies mentioned in this chapter, participants completed a written consent form before completing the scale. Upon completion of the study, participants were happy and thanked for their participation. In all of the studies presented, we assessed participants' age, sex, and education level earlier than recreation. These demographic elements had no statistically significant effect on immoral decision making in any of the reported studies (all ps > .122).

Priori Scales. The WorkPlace Scale scale, assesses work-related behaviour with five objects ($\alpha = .724$; e.g., *“Copy a company owned software program for your use”*). Partners indicated the realized abundance of the described behaviour on a 100-point slider answer scale ranging from ‘0’ (= nobody does it) to ‘100’ (= anyone does it). Higher scores indicate higher realized abundance than related behavior. Since none of the current objects have evaluated specific immoral behavior in the game, and because of the specificity of the immorality context, we developed a new one to evaluate scales related to immoral behavior in an immoral game. It says, *“Invite a government official to take a personal vacation at the expense of the company in order to secure business advantages.”*

Corruption Game. Immoral play requires three partners. In one auction, two partners compete for a full prize of 120 credits. The third partner offers the award to the best bidder

(see Figure 3). In each round, both competing partners receive 50 credits from the bidder. Rival partners can be selected from a range of options that are not available from other bids (0 credits) to invite their entire budget for Spherical (50 credits). Contestants submit credits they do not currently allocate in one bid. While the best possible bidder wins the overall prize, the award will be split equally between the two bidders, if presented the same. The bidding process continues for five rounds.




Fig 3. The triadic structure of the corruption game in which players take the role of the potentially corrupt participants.

The payback matrix (see Table 4) shows all the potential effects of this bidding process. Allocating 50 credits to the bid is the dominant approach to this bidding approach - these alternatives are in the exact Nash 2 balance. In other words, for each proposed partner of 50 credits, it achieves excellent results independently of the other partner's choice. We are made up of a immoral option for a partner in this free bidding structure. Our strategy is similar to the usual triple structure for many immoral trading deals: two (or more) competing partners - one potential immoral partner and one fair participant (ie, a victim of immorality) - and one partner. Third, it looks like an official dedication to the best possible bidder. We only report all participants in this analysis to the performance of a potentially immoral partner.


Table 4. Two players outcome matrix of the fair bidding game

| Player 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------|----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|
| | | 40 | | | 30 | | | 20 | | | 10 | | |
| Player 1 | 50 | 5060 | 60 | 120 | 10 | 120 | 20 | 120 | 30 | 120 | 40 | 120 | 50 |
| | 40 | 4010 | 120 | 70 | 70 | 130 | 20 | 130 | 30 | 130 | 40 | 130 | 50 |
| | 30 | 3020 | 120 | 20 | 130 | 80 | 80 | 140 | 30 | 140 | 40 | 140 | 50 |
| | 20 | 2030 | 120 | 30 | 130 | 30 | 140 | 90 | 90 | 150 | 40 | 150 | 50 |
| | 10 | 1040 | 120 | 40 | 130 | 40 | 140 | 40 | 150 | 100 | 100 | 160 | 50 |
| | 0 | 0 50 | 120 | 50 | 130 | 50 | 140 | 50 | 150 | 50 | 160 | 50 | 50 |

Note. The matrix shows the results for each partner earlier to introduce the immoral option into the game. There are different bid options for each partner in the different listings. Partner effects 1 shades of gray. The dominant strategy for each partner is 50 credits.

Partners can offer the authorities an amount to avoid sharing with other competitors and, thus, "break" since the partners have informed each bidder which bidding partner can determine whether Another partner is negative. They don't either. We note that theoretically any of the competing partners could be immoral, but due to the reduced complexity of the first unethical game implementation, we merely introduced a immoral alternative to the participant.

To translate this simple structure into a realistic scenario, we ask participants to assume the role of CEO of a recovery company. In the current game, the Ministry of Public Works has announced a major contract to build the bridge. Two companies are bidding for five rounds of company funding (\$ 400,000 per game). The highest bidder, the highest bidder, wins the complete bridge construction contract (\$ 120,000 per round). The same offers lead to a contract contraction (\$ 60,000 each). To make sure the participants understand the game's bidding form, we introduced the structure with different examples and asked five test questions. When answering a question incorrectly, the partners had a second risk of being answered correctly (in all three studies, members answered more than 72% of the questions correctly in the first session).



To make sure the participants understand the game's bidding form, we introduced the structure with different examples and asked five test questions. When answering a question incorrectly, the partners had a second risk of being answered correctly (in all three studies, members answered more than 72% of the questions correctly in the first session). This trend is common in commercial transactions, but can be considered immoral because it guarantees personal profit to the Minister and leads to a bidding profit for the partner (Heidenheimer, A. J., Johnson, M., and LeVine, V. T., 1989). Due to its standard functioning and legality (for example, lobbying practices), we refer to this choice as *"immoral obscurity"* in this section.

For those who feast on the Minister, there is a second invitation opportunity, which includes the Minister's invitation to a private holiday from the company's budget. This tender guarantees the benefits in 100% of the same tenders. The second decision implies more severe and illegal conduct because the company budget is used to provide the minister with a special benefit in exchange for the full benefits of the dedication of the bridge project. We call this choice *"grossly immoral"* because of its illegal nature.

Fig 4. Game three of the corruption game was used in the first study in which players make a step-wise decision associated with this issue whether to bid the Minister or not.

Reported results from the first study

The main purpose of the present study is to examine the positively theorized link between realized abundance and actual involvement in a particular immoral behavior (see Table 5 for an overview of immoral behavior). To this end, we performed two binary logistic regressions. In the first regression, an a priori immoral object was used as a predictor and the decision to propose a banquet (without bidding versus bidding) as a dependent variable. The results show that the realized abundance of immoral activity significantly influenced the minister's decision to ban ($B = 0.77$, $Wald = 5.08$, $Exp(B) = 1.86$, $p = 0.024$). The increase in the realized abundance of the immorality of a widespread deviation has increased the chances of the Secretary being invited to the banquet with the aid of a 1.86 element.

Table 5. Overview of the player's decisions in the first study

| Did participants invite the Minister? | | |
|---|-----|----|
| | Yes | No |
| First decision (bidding to the banquet) | 42 | 24 |
| Second decision (bidding to vacation) | 22 | 20 |

Note. The table shows number of partners selected for the invitation or avoid the invitation for each occasion. Note that the only partner who invited the Minister to the banquet is facing a second decision not to leave the Minister.

In the second binary logistic regression, we used the same predictor and used vacation choice as a deployable variable (invitations to no invitations to holidays). Again, we find a significant effect ($B = 0.64$, $Wald = 3.85$, $Exp(B) = 1.89$, $p < .05$). An increase in the realized abundance of a standard deviation from the immorality improved the chances of the Secretary being invited to leave through a 1.89 element. For both types of immorality, the more a partner is immoral, the more likely they are to participate. Importantly, the workplace scale scale did not predict any of the dependent variables (all $ps > .236$).

The results support our hypothesis and show that realized scales related to specific immoral behavior are related to immoral behaviors. If the partners thought that the Secretary's invitation for a private vacation from the company's budget for access to jobs was relatively common, then they might also be involved in this form of immorality. Also, REICE | 289 these realized scales also predicted the likelihood of being attracted to a variety of more severe and more ambiguous anomalies - the Minister's invitation to the banquet.

This is probably due to the strong similarity between the two types of invitations. The fact that only the particular unethical case - and not the whole workplace scale scale - predicts immoral behaviors again reflects the contextual characteristic of immorality.

To support an alternative explanation for the results, it is likely that responding to the belief-related question would increase the happiness of the scales; To rule out this possibility, we conducted a second study (Bicchieri, C., and Xiao, E., 2009). This time, we measured realized scales after the game of immorality so that the analysis of immoral scales would not have any influence on the decision to conduct immoral behaviors.

Nash Theory and the second study on corruption

Data and Materials for the Analysis

During the second study, we further simplified the game of immorality by removing the structure of two dependent variable steps. We follow such step-by-step approaches to modeling many immoral events that follow a slippery slope strategy (Darley, J. M., 2005).. Therefore, only the partner who was involved in obscure immorality decided whether or not to pursue more severe immorality. This decision-making structure deprives a large part of the sample of the second immoral decision. In order to divide the interpretation of the findings and to show clearly the relationship between realized scales and the severity of irregularities, we eliminated the ambiguous non-ethical option. So partners were directly faced with the choice of whether they would like to propose a minister for private vacations (ie, more immoral immorality) who wins 100% of the bids (see Figure 5 for a game of three simple immoral games).

Participants and Protocol. Students in Polish society who had graduated from programs of higher education from “Adam Mickiewicz University, Gdansk University of Technology, Jagiellonian University, Kozminski University, University of Lodz, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Warsaw, University of Wroclaw.” covering eight different Polish universities and entrepreneurs consisting of entrepreneurs who had graduated from programs of higher education and other entrepreneurs who had not received any training in ethics (N = 119, Mage = 21.57, SDage = 2.80, 63% = female) participated for course credit or money (2€). Participants first played the unsuitable simple game and then demonstrated their realized descriptive scales. Apart from simplifying the dependent variables, the game was used in the same way as in the first study.




Fig 5. Game three of the simplified corruption game in which the players at once face the choice of whether or not to bid the Minister to the vacation.

Post hoc scales. Upon completion of the immoral game, all participants responded to a question that assessed their realized abundance of holiday bidding (ie, “How many people do you think would recommend a vacation minister”) to answer six - Scale point from '1'

(= no one) to '6' (= all). Among the endpoints of the scale, participants could choose four percent of the abundance (1-25%; 26- 50%; 51-75%; 75-99%). We also manipulated public awareness of the three conditions. The partners were either in a cube that turned on a webcam, a webcam was off, or no webcam at all. This manipulation had no effect on the reported results.

Reported results from the second study

In the second study, we assessed whether the descriptive scales (measured after immorality play) relate to immoral behaviors. We computed a binary logistic regression with realized scales as a predictor and immoral decision (ie, holiday invitations) as the dependent variable. We searched for a significant effect ($B = 1.42$, Wald = 26.72, Exp (B) = 4.162, $p < .001$). Improving realized scales of immorality through a standard deviation has increased the chances of the Minister being invited to vacation through Elements 4.16.

Given the importance of early influences for ripe picking (Bargh, J., & Chartrand, T., 1999), we also examined whether filling the WPN scale in the first study caused unethical behavior. We tested whether the level of anomalies previously in the first study was higher than in the second study, where participants did not complete the WPN scale before the immoral game. We did not see any difference between holiday tenders ($\chi^2 = .119$, $p = 0.730$), nor in the ambiguous immorality in the first study with the severe immorality in the second study, hence the first choice in both studies, ($\chi^2 = 1.16$, $p = .28$).

Discussion associated with the result of the second study

The results once again show a sure link between immoral behavior and descriptive scales of this form of immorality. In the second study, partners were asked to perceive their scales after playing an immoral game. Participants may perceive their scales to change according to their behavior in the game (ie, scales that serve as rationales). Alongside the first study, in which scales were assessed before moral play, we strongly support the close link between descriptive scales and immoral behavior in play. The more participants

perceive immoral behavior, the more likely it is that there is immoral behavior in an unethical game.

Nash Theory and the third study on corruption

One way to interpret the scale difference obtained in the second step is in the second study of logical strategies. Individuals may justify and justify immoral behaviors by claiming that this is a *"joint work"*. Previous research supports this notion by examining immoral behavior (Mazar, N., Amir, O., and Ariely, D., 2008b; Ariely, D., 2012). By showing that people are lying and lying if they have more excuses or explanations. Descriptive scales may be an excuse (Kerr, N. L., andamp; Kaufman-Gilliland, C. M., 1997) and a common technique. Ethical constructions may be moving, meaning that individuals may change their realized personal scales in their behavior (Ashforth, B. E., andamp; Anand, V., 2003). We argue that in addition to acting as an explanation of immoral behaviors, descriptive scales in addition They also provide a precedent for immoral behavior.

To test this assumption and provide causal evidence, we conducted a 0.33 study in which we tested whether manipulating descriptive scales could influence immoral behaviors. Previous research suggests that small ethics-related ethics can reduce unethical behavior such as fraud (Mazar, N., Amir, O., and Ariely, D., 2008b; Bryan, C., Adams, G., and Monin, B., 2012). Using descriptive scales related (Wenzel, M., 2004) to primes, a set of behaviors ranging from improved tax compliance to enhanced energy consumption behaviors is presented (Nolan, J. M., Schultz, P. W., Cialdini, R. B., Goldstein, N. J., andamp; Griskevicius, V., 2008; Schultz, P. W., Nolan, J. M., Cialdini, R. B., Goldstein, N. J., andamp; Griskevicius, V., 2007). However, there is no empirical test of the effect of scaleative descriptive numbers on immorality. To investigate the cause-and-effect relationship of realized scales with immoral behavior, we conducted a laboratory in which we manipulated descriptive scales by providing participants with a brief introduction before making an unethical decision.

Data and Materials for the Analysis

We used the same simple study design as the second study. In addition, we reduced tenders from five to one to reduce the complexity of computing tools for participants. Prior to that, the partners had to anticipate the immoral advantage of five bids. Now they just have to wait for unrealistic profits to get out of bidding. Economically, ethical profit is the same, but it is easier for participants to calculate immoral profit. REICE | 293

Participants and Protocol. We conducted an online study (N = 259; Mage = 35.65; SD age = 11.54; 42.1% = female) in English through Amazon Mechan Turk. Participants were eager to reside in the United States and accepted more than 5,000 HITs with a minimum agreement rate of 98%. Participants participated with a \$ 1 refund. Participants first read the unethical game instructions. They received one of three scaleative statements before deciding whether to invite the Minister or on vacation. In the context of anti-immoral scales, we make our partners an instant statement, *"Almost no one invites the Minister."* In favor of the scale, quick reads *"almost everyone invites the minister."* In the control condition, the participant received. It's not that urgent. After completing the immoral game, we re-evaluated the realized descriptive scales with the same question as assessed in the second study. In addition, half of the partners received time pressure notifications, which did not affect the reported results.

Reported results from the third study

Measurement of realized descriptive scales. To investigate whether scale manipulation actually influenced realized scales of immorality, we conducted an ANOVA with scale manipulation (three levels) as a predictor and examined realized scales (post-game). We examine it as a dependent variable. Results showed significant differences in realized scales between the three groups ($R = 0.34$, $F(2,225) = 70.9$, $P < 0.01$). Participants in terms of immorality scales perceive immorality to be the control condition ($M = 4.03$, $SD = 1.25$), which in turn considers the claim to be immoral to be the least common, to be the least common. Is ($M = 2.57$, $SD = 1.33$). It was more common than participants in the pro-scale condition ($M = 4.74$, $SD = 1.06$). All post-holiday micro-group comparisons are significant (all $PS < .002$; modified Bonferroni).

Hypotheses testing. In the first step, compared with the other two studies, we find that the total immorality level in the online study was higher compared to the two pre-test laboratories ($\chi^2 = 9.37$, $p = .009$), most likely due to an increase Anonymity. The Internet We then tested whether scale manipulation by computing logistic regression represented scale manipulation as a predictor variable and the decision to engage in immorality as a dependent variable. In this third study, participants in the ethical scales condition were significantly less than the participants in the control condition of irresponsible scales ($B = 0.83$, $B = 6.43$, 0.6 $p = 0.011$, prediction (2.30) The odds of being attracted to immorality in the anti-immoral scale were 2.3 times lower than in the control condition.

In addition, we found a significant difference between the condition of anti-immorality scales and the condition of pro-immorality scales ($B = 0.79$, Wald = 5.87, $p = 0.015$, Exp (B) = 2.30). The odds of being attracted to immorality were 2.3 times higher than those of anti-ethical scales. There was no significant difference between control and pro-scale conditions ($p = 0.89$). Thus, the first anti-immorality scale has significantly reduced the level of immoral behaviors in play compared to the control of the immorality scale.

In addition, we assessed whether realized scales play a role in influencing manipulated scales. Two mediation analyzes using bootstrap evaluate two significant effects (anti-control; anti-scales) indicating complete mediation in each case (anti-control: CI95 % [-1.83;-0.73]; Anti-Pro-Scales: CI95; [-2.59; -1.2]).

Discussion related to the results from the third study

The results of the third study explain that descriptive scales can influence subsequent levels of immoral behaviors. When partners receive a brief urgency indicating a low abundance of immoral behaviors, the extent of the maladjustment is greatly reduced compared to control conditions and pro-immoral scales. Interestingly, the results show that there is no difference in immoral behavior between the pro-scale and the control condition, which indicates that individual immoral behavior is generally considered universal.

Conclusions

Contrary to the widespread belief that corruption comes about through a slippery slope, the present studies provide novel evidence suggesting that the path towards severe corruption might rather be a steep cliff. Across three studies, people were more likely to engage in severe corruption when this option was presented abruptly rather than gradually, even though they did acknowledge the unethicity of severe corruption. In fact, the moral evaluation of severe corruption, as well as the (combined) economic costs and benefits, did not differ across the different conditions. REICE | 295

Given that most scientists, and laymen alike, believe in the slippery slope analogy, it is important to ask the obvious: How can we account for evidence favoring the steep cliff rather than the slippery slope? One line of reasoning is that the intuitively compelling notion that repeated transgressions lower moral thresholds may not always be true. Rather than a process of habituation and moral disengagement, it is possible that people seek to avoid repetition of corruption because it is expected to be psychologically taxing – especially when the corrupt opportunities occur in short succession (Mazar, Ayal, & Ariely, 2008b). It poses another threat to one's self-image, and therefore even a second more minor form of corruption can be undesirable (Study 3).

When deciding whether to engage in unethical behavior, people take both the external costs and benefits and the psychological cost and benefits of the respective act into account (Messick & Bazerman, 1996). Unlike previous studies (Welsh et al., 2014), we kept the economic costs and benefits constant across different conditions. Thus, our findings point towards a new psychological factor – the sequence of decisions. A single severe act, directly presented at the participants, might be easier to justify causing less tension between being a moral person on the one hand and enjoying the benefits of dishonesty on the other hand (Batson, 2016).

A complementary argument is that a single act requires less intentionality and planning than repeated behaviors (Batson & Powell, 2003). The large benefits might reinforce a selective focus on self-interest, rather than a positive self-image. In contrast to previous

work (Welsh et al., 2014), this study looks at bribery, a form of unethical behavior that entails a collaboration between multiple corrupt agents (Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti, & Van Lange, 2016; Weisel & Shalvi, 2015). The resulting local social utility (*"I also help the other,"* Ayal & Gino, 2011), might give rise to reputational concerns regarding the other agents, which then further facilitates these self-serving justifications.

Clearly, future research is needed to examine the underlying mechanisms and boundary conditions. For example, how severe corruption emerges under varying punishment regimes requires future research. Yet, given the ubiquity of the belief in the slippery slope, we conclude with two lessons from the present research. One lesson is that people may be more willing to engage in severe, single (and perhaps unexpected) instances of corruption than widely believed— even if they recognize the immorality of these behaviors. Another lesson is that repeated forms of unethical behavior may be more psychologically taxing than most of us tend to believe, especially if the second occasion brings about smaller benefits for self. These findings thus shed light on an unexplored area of sequential corrupt decision-making. Overall, our findings suggest that those who are willing to engage in bribery seek to obtain the biggest advantage for the lowest moral price. Instead of going through a process of repeatedly engaging in corruption (slippery slope), they rather are opportunistic once (steep cliff).

The rest of this research is as follows. First, we concentrate on theoretical arguments and refine testable hypotheses. We then describe the source of the data, variables, methods, and findings. Finally, we conclude with a discussion and outcome for policymakers and firms. Scholars Luis Enrique Orozco, Jaime Páez, Germán Montoya, and Javier Pombo all accepted that although one cannot generalize, some business owners participate in immoral acts, regardless of their age, education, or the age of their businesses. Some entrepreneurs place economic interests above social interests, but scholars focused on the following:

- I. Neither the effect of business owners on immoral practices nor the extent to which immorality pervades their thoughts and actions has yet been analyzed.

II. Entrepreneurs have not been profiled concerning their ethical behaviour.

III. Entrepreneurs and their performance respond to rules that emerge from the environment.

IV. The environment is polluted because values are not strongly imbued either in the home environment or schools. REICE | 297

V. Entrepreneurs are not born immoral. Over time, they approve the idea of immorality as a feature of scaleal behaviour.

VI. What did universities stop doing that used to produce good young students? When they graduate as professionals now, they are a symbol of national immorality.

VII. Personal and professional success is measured via the possession of things and the desire to enhance income more quickly and with less effort. This thinking may convince business owners to engage in unethical practices in order to achieve this version of success.

VIII. Education must be modernized as is being done in the business world, and it must incorporate ethical topics more effectively than is the case in traditional programs.

IX. Numerous scandals in Poland, including immoral contracting in urban improvement (carousel de contratación, Los Nule), price-fixing for consumer products (el cartel de los pañales, el cartel de Los Cuadernos), and immoral investment schemes (Interbolsa) make it clear that there is a crisis of values in the business environment.

X. University graduates are very well prepared for entrepreneurship but lack a grounding in business ethics.

XI. Universities have a responsibility for the business ethics of their graduates, but the role of the family, society, and the social environment must also be considered.

XII. Jaime Páez indicates that between some of his students who have started businesses, the early years of their entrepreneurship were characterized via a frenzy to establish the company, to innovate, and to act ethically, but with the passing of time their ethical training faded from memory, their ethical method waned, and they adopted unethical practices prevalent in the business world.

The effect of descriptive scales on immoral behaviors has often been theorized, but as far as we know - it has never been tested (Rothstein, B., 2000; Bicchieri, C., and Rovelli, C., 1995). The current set of studies provides the first empirical support for the hypothesized transplant.

Realized descriptive scales were associated with subsequent immoral behavior (the first study of immorality). In order to rule out that scaleative health enhances this effect, we introduced a realized scale difference in addition to evaluating scales after evaluating immoral behavior (the second study of immorality). Finally, concise statements containing scaleative descriptive data have been successfully influenced. In particular, information showing low abundance of immoral behaviors (ethical scales) has reduced the level of subsequent immoral behaviors (Third Study of Ethics). Anti-immorality scales may have had some effect due to the realized abundance of immorality in the relatively large sample.

People trust descriptive scales as a guideline for making immoral decisions, especially in situations with little or no personal experience (Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., and Kallgren, C., 1990; Hogg, M. A., Hohman, Z. P., and Rivera, J. E., 2008). We place participants in such uncertain and uncertain circumstances that are descriptive scales, especially based on beliefs and not on our personal experience. Participants in the study, who rely heavily on scales, suggest that people who are confronted with such particular conditions may be particularly susceptible to descriptive scales, in particular selection criteria.

Experience in organizations that have no personal experience with business: If they believe that immorality is not commonplace, they probably will. Our results provide a new experimental path for how scale-related reminder can form immoral scales. Small reminders and messages can potentially create a "dumb" (Thaler, R., and Sunstein, C., 2008). To reduce immorality - especially in literatures where humans lack firsthand experience or falsely believe that high percentage are involved in immorality.

From a methodological point of view, immoral play provides an indirect test tool that allows scientists to view psychology that contains immoral factors.

In addition, it accepts immoral test decisions when participants have first-hand experiences, even through which they report an ethical dilemma. By covering up immorality in a bidding game, it allows for the study of immorality whilst avoiding favorable social effects. Using stupid immoral play, we distribute the first definition of the link between realized and immoral descriptive scales. REICE | 299

It is noteworthy that in the three studies presented in this article, there was no financial incentive or reprimand. Considerations of tangible results or cost-benefit calculations are unlikely to reflect current findings. Unlike most ethical investigations in which reward and reprimand play an important role, we opted for this design because it allows us to identify descriptive scales as the main driver of uncovering the immoral complexity of a isolated environment. Indeed, one important issue for future research lies in examining how scaleative influences in all types of literature, including those that are incentives and reprimands, strike immorality. Future research can also conclude that descriptive scales influence realized reprimand for immorality.

In addition, does the realized abundance of immorality increase when the potential profit is high? Although the relationship between the abundance of reprimand and descriptive scales may seem plausible, how is the relationship between reprimand severity and descriptive scales? This question is particularly interesting in gray areas of ethics, such as the vague morality raised in the first study of immorality.

In the third study of immorality, we show that scales are influenced externally because it causes the short term to successfully influence the realized descriptive scales. In a positive note, we found that anti-immorality scales reduced the level of subsequent immoral behaviors. Since we have used relatively specific manipulations of scales in the third study, the use of implicit manipulations is a more interesting way of investigating immorality, especially given that many forms of abuse of power occur besides conscious awareness (Lee-Chai, A. Y., and Bargh, J., 2001).

Recent related research shows that the belief that immorality is spreading affects the likelihood of immorality. In fact, in order to obtain generalizable results, we could put

participants in an immoral position, but due to some limitations, we asked them to imagine an immorality situation that would have an impact on the results as well. Given the personality of immorality, studying immorality in the context of real life poses a major challenge to immorality research. Immorality transactions and operations, as stated in this study, provide a way to empirically study immorality. Further studies can examine the impact of descriptive scales on other forms of immoral behaviour in order to generalize the results obtained, in other ways, such as economic factors (Dungan, J., Waytz, A., and Young, L., 2014) and remuneration and fines (Henrich, J., Ensminger, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., ...? Ziker, J., 2010).

Many studies are being carried out to discover how immorality scales are shaped. For example, will media reports about immorality affect immoral behaviour? How? Previous research has indicated that media coverage is strongly influenced by descriptive scales, which in turn leads to imitation of advertising behaviors (Cialdini, R. B., 2006; Phillips, D., 1974). Whether a similar "copycat" immoral behavior follows a well-known illegal act (for example, the Madoff case) can be an interesting topic for future research.

We reported the importance of more accurate psychological indicators for descriptive scales realized in immoral behaviours as the first empirical support. The notion that immorality is widespread has a very important influence on the decision-making of immoral behaviours – perceptions that can be influenced by the pressure of small scales. Alster described social scales as "*the cement of society*" because of the importance of descriptive scales in everyday decisions. In a society that is completely immoral, the 'cement of social scales' is conducive to immorality, but in a society with less immorality, the opposite is the case, and immorality is completely eliminated so that things can go as scales (Elster, J., 1989). Referring to the first example, a series of recent related studies show that your answer to the question of whether you would bid the Minister is related to your belief in immoral behaviour to that of others. The idea that no one gives the proposed minister reduces the amount of immoral activity, while if you consider it as a general business activity, the areas of immorality will increase for you and you will say: "*I invite the Minister, who does not?*"

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